

WASHINGTON.

"Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable."

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1847.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.—No. III.

The Administration, speaking through its mouth-piece, (the "Union,") affects to consider this journal, in what it has had occasion to say of that part of the Message which relates to the War with Mexico, as being the organ of the Whig party in Congress. We protest against this assumption. We claim to speak only as journalists of some experience, who, in the present critical state of public affairs—to all the honor of which, no one, not even the President himself, will deny that the Executive is justly entitled—have felt it to be an indispensable duty to communicate to their readers, without reserve, what they know and what they think of it. We do not believe that the Whig was mentioned in the whole course of our review. We certainly were *thinking* of the revolting character of War and its consequences to the whole country, and not of its effect upon this or that party. Unlike the partisan of power, who gave out, about a year ago, that the war must be prolonged "at least until after the Presidential election," we were writing under a deep and solemn conviction that the interest and the true welfare of twenty millions of souls, over whom this Government extends, required this war to be brought to an end as early as it could be, consistently with National honor; and, as one of the arguments for bringing it to an end, we undertook to show that it ought never to have been begun.

The Executive organ represents us, in doing this, as having "thrown the lie direct into the teeth of the National Executive." Our readers will bear us witness that we did not so far forget ourselves. We should as soon have thought of accusing the President of *treason*—an offence with which, in his Annual Message of last year, he did not scruple to stigmatize all those who had the hardihood to dispute the necessity or expediency of his Mexican War—as to have done what the government paper imputes to us. We certainly differ very widely from His Excellency with regard to the facts upon which he relies for his defence for involving the country in this war. We declare certain propositions, upon which, in his Message, he himself places his justification to his fellow citizens for this war, to be untrue. We think that we have proved them to be so. But we have not pretended to say that the President himself *believes* them to be untrue: we are not the keepers of the President's conscience. But, if he do believe them to be true, we may yet be allowed to lament the misfortune of his country that he should, under that delusion, have been the cause of throwing away so many lives and so large an amount of the public treasure, which might, both lives and treasure, have been so much more wisely and usefully employed.

The government paper makes it matter of complaint against us that we have not said a word to controvert the statement of the Message that indemnity cannot be obtained from Mexico "in any other form than by a cession of territory." Let the Administration be appeased upon this point. Let it be admitted that Mexico cannot pay in money even what she owes, much less what she does not. Let it be admitted, also, however, as conclusively put by one of our contemporaries, that the argument thus insisted upon is deadly fatal to that other suggestion in the Message, that, by means of forced contributions levied upon Mexico through our military commanders, the future expenses of the war are to be defrayed. The two propositions cannot stand together.

The government paper in like manner claims from us acquiescence in sundry other positions of the Message, for that we have not controverted them. In reply to which it is enough to say that we have not *done* with the Message. But who on earth would think of undertaking seriously to refute such a proposition as that of the Message, re-stated by the "Union" as follows: "That the Congress of the United States is as fully committed by its past acts, as the President claims it to be in his Message, to the whole purpose and doctrine of prosecuting the war to the acquisition of a full territorial indemnity?" The only answer that can be made to such a proposition, which the "Union" expresses surprise that we have not said "one word" to contradict, is, that it is impossible to find even "one word" in any act or resolution of the Congress of the United States to sustain it. Congress is in no way whatever committed to the schemes of conquest and dominion which are at length avowed by the Executive. If any thing of the sort can be found on the statute-book—if the assertion of the Message in this respect be not wholly groundless—it is in the power of the "Union" to give us chapter and verse for it.

There are other things in the reply of the organ of the Administration to the National Intelligencer, which, had we the necessary time at command, might be considered worthy of special notice. But for the present we pass them by—the poor rivalry included, with which some graduate of Billingsgate has been allowed to soil the columns of a journal which ought to reflect, to the extent of decency at least, the manners as well as the sentiments of the gentlemen who control it—and proceed to offer to our readers the following

FURTHER VIEWS OF THE MEXICAN WAR.

Amongst the allegations of the government paper, in its first reply to this journal, is the following: "The Intelligencer does not even pretend to make any attempt to shake the immovable foundation of fact and argument on which the President, in his annual Message of December last, placed the rightfulness of our claim and of the claim of Texas to the boundary of the Rio Grande."

Whether we did or did not make an "attempt" to shake the President's foundation, &c. our readers know as well as we: whether we succeeded or not, is another matter. We have at least, it is clear, failed in convincing the government editor, although we produced record evidence of every fact to which we appealed. For his especial advantage, we will try another line of demonstration. If the government editor will not believe us, will he believe the President? We quote from his Message, now before us, the following:

"New Mexico is a frontier province, and has never been of any considerable value to Mexico. From its locality, it is naturally connected with our western settlements. The territorial limits

of the State of Texas, too, as defined by her laws, before her admission into our Union, embrace all that portion of New Mexico lying west of the Rio Grande, while Mexico still claims to hold this territory as a part of her dominions. The adjustment of this question of boundary is important."

This is all true. If the "laws" of Texas on the subject were not a mere and sheer nullity so far as they pretend to establish a boundary to which the State had no color of title, New Mexico east of the Rio Grande is as much a part of Texas as the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. But all this territory was alike Mexican. No part of it was brought within the limits of the State of Texas by her revolution, or by right of conquest. No part of it, therefore, was or could be conveyed by Texas to the United States. If it was "New Mexico," as the President says it was, how could it be Texas?

One and the same rule, it is perfectly clear, must be applicable to all the territory east of the Rio Grande heretofore belonging to Mexico. It is all either still Mexican, or it is Texas. But the President marches an army into one part of it on the plea of its being his duty to defend "our own soil"—territory of the United States, derived from Texas—and invades and conquers the other, demanding a cession of it as a State of Mexico, and now recommending to Congress to establish a Territorial Government within it!

"The Commissioner of the United States is authorized," says the Message, "to obtain a cession to the United States of the [Mexican] Provinces of New Mexico and California," &c. The relation of this province of New Mexico to the two nations (the United States and Mexico) was precisely and identically the same as that of the territory lying between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. Yet the President made war, under an alleged indispensable duty to maintain the title of the United States to the one, and in that war conquered the other from Mexico, in order that he might obtain possession of it as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, into which he says Mexico forced us by attempting to defend her own territory from invasion. It is impossible for the President to extricate himself from the horns of this dilemma.

From the beginning of his administration up to this day, the President, animated and impelled, apparently, by an ambition to distinguish himself beyond his predecessor in the annals of annexation, has been all in the wrong upon this Mexican question. Even in his inaugural Address, though the word "Mexico" is not mentioned, the source is discoverable of all the mischievous proceedings of the Executive, which, however honestly intended, have almost undone the country. In that Address is plainly discernible the germ of that longing for forbidden fruit, that hankering after the lands of our neighbors, that determination, *per fas aut nefas*, to possess ourselves of them, which have evidently influenced and directed the whole policy of the Executive in regard to Mexico. We refer, of course, to those passages in which the President argues the safety to our political system of the enlargement of our boundaries. The meaning of the following sentence, for example, though it attracted little notice at the time, cannot now be mistaken: "To enlarge its limits [the limits of our Union] is to extend the dominions of peace over additional territories and increasing millions." This remark could have had reference only to those territories of Mexico, the annexation of which, as conquered country, the President proposes in the Message now before us.

In the first months of his official term, it may be that the President calculated upon accomplishing his purposes without a war with Mexico, though, from the moment of the installation of his confidential editor, the idea of War and Conquest, in some shape or other, seemed continually to haunt his imagination. Within the first six weeks of the existence of the official paper, it was made quite evident that there existed no disposition to pay any respect to the law of our own Congress which enjoined the settlement of the question of boundary by negotiation with Mexico. Even before the consummation of the act of annexation—before its acceptance by the Government and People of Texas—the line of the Rio Grande was repeatedly claimed, and, in the event of Mexico proving obstinate and impracticable on that point, "additional annexations" threatened and the acquisition of California prophesied. These demonstrations in fact preceded the order to Gen. TAYLOR of the 15th June, 1845, advising him of the design eventually to press forward his army to the east bank of the Rio Grande; and, so bewitched was the Official Editor by the enchanting prospect which a war with Mexico was expected to unfold to our country, in opening to it "the road to California" and enabling it to "spread far and wide the great principle of self-government," that there seemed at least a willingness on his part to permit, if not a disposition to provoke, a state of things from which such glorious results were anticipated. In September it was plainly indicated that a more belligerent attitude than was then exhibited on the part of Mexico would be quite agreeable to him. On the 10th of that month the purpose of moving our army to the Rio Grande was disclosed, and a day or two after this it was stated that our boundary had been irrevocably planted at the Rio Grande, in regard to which "neither the bullets of the Mexicans nor the paper-shot of their friends in this country" would "be able to shake the determination of our Executive." This determination was rendered the more remarkable from the fact of the repetition of the same identical statement in three several numbers of the official journal, which was equivalent to telling Mexico that any negotiation for it was entirely out of the question. In the mean time, General TAYLOR, in command of the force stationed at Corpus Christi, had more than once been reminded by the War Department that an advance upon the Rio Grande, at any time, would be acceptable to the Administration. But the General knew better than to incur the responsibility of such a movement; and respectfully but

positively declined doing so in a letter to the War Department, under date of October 4, 1845:

"Mexico having as yet made no positive declaration of war, nor committed any overt act of hostilities, [said the General,] I do not feel at liberty, under my instructions, to make a forward movement to the Rio Grande without authority from the War Department."

About the time that this letter reached Washington, the President was engaged in preparing his first Message to Congress, and had already determined to recommend some measure of hostility against Mexico on the ostensible ground of the unpaid instalments of indemnity, &c.—when information was received here of the willingness of Mexico to receive a Commissioner to treat concerning the boundary question. [We here re-state this point, because it appears to us a very material one in the history of the War in which the President contrived, without consulting Congress, afterwards to involve the country.] This induced a change in the Message and in the intended recommendation to Congress to resort to war upon Mexico; of which change, and the reason of it, Congress was apprized, in the Annual Message of December, 1845, in terms which Mexico perhaps understood, though we doubt whether Congress did.

"Forbear," said the President, "to recommend to Congress such ulterior measures of redress for the wrongs and injuries we have so long borne, as it would have been proper to make had no such negotiations been instituted."

Instead of a Commissioner, as proposed by Mexico, the President sent a Minister Plenipotentiary, whose instructions have never been published. If they ever are, it will be found that he was ordered not to negotiate a settlement of the Boundary of Texas (though, as before said, such a negotiation had been directed by Congress) unless in complication with the cession to the United States of California, by way of indemnity for the old claims, of which such an exaggerated and distorted account has been given in the several Messages of the President. As far as concerns the claims, we know from the President himself that Mr. SLIDELL was thus instructed. The President could not, he has informed Congress, for a moment entertain the idea that the claims of our citizens should be postponed, or separated from the boundary question. Nor, we presume, (in the absence of documentary proof,) was our Commissioner to be allowed to establish a satisfactory boundary between the United States (Texas included) and Mexico, without securing at the same time a cession of California.

Had the President met the overture of the Mexican Government in a proper spirit, by sending a Commissioner to treat of the only imminent question—the question of boundary; had he not pertinaciously insisted on clogging that question with things having no necessary connexion with it, the boundary might have been amicably settled; the claims of our citizens examined and adjudicated at leisure; and the desired territory on the Northwest Coast acquired by purchase. And there would have been no war; for there would have been no pretence for it.

Without waiting for the sanction of Congress to a measure which was itself an act of war—so obviously so, that the Commander of the Army would not take the responsibility of it, though invited to do so—peremptory orders were given, while Mr. SLIDELL was yet in communication with the Government of Mexico, for the march to the Rio Grande. What followed is known to every reader. The war was an inevitable consequence of the march of our army into the Mexican territory at the time and in the manner in which it took place.

Mexico had indeed regarded and resented the annexation of Texas by the United States, without her consent, as a hostile act, and had threatened retaliation. But threats are not hostilities. She never would have made any approach to our army, much less have attacked it, whilst it confined itself to the known limits of Texas. After she knew of the advance of our army into the Mexican territory, she did no more than defend that territory from aggression which she had before exhausted every act of peace to avert. There would clearly have been no war with Mexico, had the event depended upon her striking the first blow.

It can hardly be necessary to recur to writers on the Law of Nations to show that, independently of the constitutional obligation upon our President to abstain from war, this war was wholly unjust, because wholly unnecessary; and that, even if it were not unjust, it ought not to have been prosecuted further than required by the supposed necessity which gave rise to it. If all that the President avers as to the origin of the war were, irrefragable truth, it yet could not affect the position that the war has been pushed to an extent not required by justice, by national honor, or even by national sentiment. It would have ceased long ago, if to "conquer a peace" only had been its object, or if its real object had not been to wrest from Mexico, on the poorest of pretences, territories which she would probably never surrender, to the extent required, but with her national existence.

That this is the object for which the war is to be further prosecuted is no longer disguised by the Executive. The terms upon which alone the President will, under any circumstances, consent to a peace, are, as stated in the Message, the establishment of a western boundary for the United States to the Rio Grande, (which includes parts of four Mexican provinces), and the cession to the United States of the States or Provinces of New Mexico and Upper California. These States, now occupied by our military forces, the President is satisfied should "never be surrendered to Mexico," but held forever, with or without her consent. He invites Congress now to do, what he has heretofore undertaken to do of his own authority, to establish territorial governments over them. He even goes so far as to advise Congress "to hold these provinces permanently, and that they shall hereafter be considered as constituent parts of our country." This last recommendation being directly in contempt of one of the plainest principles of the law of nations.

"Inmovables, lands, towns, provinces, &c. [says 'Fattel'] pass under the power of the enemy who makes himself master of them; but it is only by the treaty of peace, or the entire submission and extinction of the State to which these towns and provinces belonged, that the acquisition is completed, and the property becomes stable and perfect."

To the same effect are repeated decisions of our own Supreme Court. Witness the following: "By a conquest, the conqueror acquires nothing but a temporary right of possession and govern-

ment over the territory conquered, until a pacification, and cannot, in the mean time, impair, by any transfer, the rights of the former sovereign."

[Clark vs. The U. States, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 161. U. States vs. Haywood, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 501.]

Meanwhile, the Government of Mexico having declined to accede to "the equitable and liberal terms" proposed by the President, he recommends to Congress to "prosecute the war with increased energy and power in the vital parts of the enemy's country."

These recommendations of the President to Congress, in regard to the prosecution of the War, are, perhaps, all things considered, not inconsistent with the spirit in which the President entered upon the discharge of his Executive duties, and the objects which he sought to accomplish by marching an Army into the territories of Mexico, whether his intention was to force her into a war or merely to intimidate her into humiliating concessions. Unappealed by the slaughter and devastation with which he has already visited her borders, since he has not yet forced her to a voluntary surrender of her coveted territories, the President proposes not only to continue the war in a savage and vindictive spirit, but to "annex" the provinces above referred to—the acquisition of which is now avowed to have been the object of the war—and to conquer and occupy all the rest of Mexico, should she not meanwhile fall upon her knees, confess her fault, and implore our pardon for having given us the trouble of invading her! That is about the amount of the Executive recommendations in regard to the future of this war.

In what manner Congress will respond to these recommendations our readers will learn in due time. What we think of the design of conquering all Mexico cannot be more forcibly expressed than in the language of Mr. CALHOUN, in the resolution which he has moved in the Senate. We hold, with that eminent statesman, that "to conquer Mexico and to hold it, either as a province or to incorporate it in our Union, would be inconsistent with the [hitherto] avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted; a departure from the settled policy of the Government, in conflict with its character and genius, and, in the end, subversive of our free and popular institutions." But we go further: We believe that to conquer any part of Mexico, and to hold it by conquest, as proposed by the President, would be in conflict with the character and genius of our Government, and most dangerous to our free and happy institutions.

Will not the PEOPLE at length awake from their slumber on the brink of a fearful precipice? Are they content to depart from that hitherto settled policy of our country which has taught us to avoid all sorts of aggression on neighboring Powers? To depart from the policy of peace and content within our own borders, in pursuit of foreign conquest and dominion? Is there so little of patriotism and pride of race among them that they can tamely consent to see our own nationality degraded, our flag dimmed and blurred by the accession of motley stars, and our population swelled by unknown tribes, who, whilst they will contribute little or nothing to the common stock, will, besides filling our council-halls with many-colored representatives, add immensely to the expenses of our Government?

If the People are prepared to submit to these things—the necessary results of the policy recommended to Congress by the President—have they seriously thought of other inevitable consequences of the career of ambition and conquest in which we are embarked? How few of them have ever reflected, for instance, that one of these consequences is the establishment and perpetuation of

A GREAT STANDING ARMY!

The first condition of all conquest upon a large scale is, we need hardly tell any body, the raising and keeping permanently on foot of a numerous and well-appointed public force, Naval or Military.

In the Message which we are now considering, the President calls upon the country to grant him, for his proposed plan of conquering all Mexico, (for such it really is,) additional troops and further loans. The numerical amount of the former is not specified, except in the Secretary of War's report; but that of the latter is, at least, named with an assumed precision. We look on the estimates of both as exceedingly fallacious; as designed, by their apparent lowness, to lure the public on to a further prosecution of the war; as entirely inadequate, however, to that which it is known must be done; as merely enough to make the war, upon its present scale even, live on "from hand to mouth," instead of giving it any fresh "vigor"; and, finally, we see not the slightest sign of that which is the duty of all republican rulers, when they engage their country in war—not to shift off the debts of that war upon men unborn; but to bring the war, its adequateness of cause, all its merits, and all its realities, at once to the test of taxation, by laying burdens enough on the people to defray the expenses of the whole business. Whether or not the good people of these United States are fond of the costly diversion of ruining or enslaving great regions in their neighborhood, can only be told by asking them to pay for the amusement out of their own pockets, and not by drafts upon posterity.

But the President requires more troops, more loans. Yes, more money, more men! And both, whatever the Message may flatteringly promise, with no visible limit, and to no attainable end. Merely to march upon and occupy all the Mexican departments and their chief towns and strong places, it is easy enough to see that more than double our present force there must be set in motion in every direction, at more than double the past rate of expenditure. For, in order to conquer a department, though but in name, it must be overrun by a particular expedition for that purpose. This expedition must be strong enough and well-appointed enough to dread no repulse. As it advances, it must secure its communications, not merely that it may command reinforcements, but supplies; for it would be mere madness to depend for food upon regions where the very soil, arid and uncultivated, is as hostile as the inhabitants themselves. Across long and difficult tracts, abounding in dangerous passes, munitions of the commissariat and of ordnance cannot pass, except with strong escorts and by lines along which are frequent armed posts, for resting and refitting the convoys, as well as securing the intervening country and holding the guerrillas in check. Well! of the nineteen Departments or States of Mexico, some twelve or four-

teen will have to be invaded, conquered, and occupied by as many separate expeditions. Each of these must, as soon as it has got possession of the particular State-capital, at which it had struck, fix itself there, as a local army of occupation, which must remain there, to bridle—aye, and to govern—the entire department. But, as the presence of a few thousand troops of an enemy in Philadelphia, or at Annapolis, or in Richmond, would not reduce Columbia or Carlisle or Pittsburgh, Baltimore or Frederick or Cumberland, Charlottesville or Lynchburg or Staunton, to submission, so in the Mexican States. That of Mexico (area 30,482 square miles) has a population of a million, and several considerable towns besides the capital to be garrisoned; Puebla (the State, area 18,441 square miles) has nearly an equal population and a chief town of 75,000 souls; Guanajuato (area 6,225 square miles) has a town of 63,000 souls, and a general population of 600,000; Michoacan (area 24,166 square miles) has a collective population of 385,000, its capital, Valladolid, 16,500; Jalisco has, on an area of 72,389 square miles, a population of 600,000, and a capital, Guadalajara, of 26,000; Zacatecas has an area of 17,580 square miles, and a population of 230,298; Oajaca, an area of 32,697 square miles, and a population of 600,000, with a capital of 32,000. These examples may give some general idea of the populations and surfaces over which these separate corps of occupation will have to act. Now, to hold a single town, though it should be the capital, in each State would (as we have already intimated) be of little effect towards reducing to submission a half-barbarous State, whose remotest districts, often defended by the wildest mountains, and made by national hate doubly untamable, arms cannot reach nor any thing but extreme length of possession bring under your sway.

In short, each State must, besides a garrison in its capital and lines of stations connecting the force there with their supplies, have detached corps fixed at a variety of points, where a large population exists, to be by degrees awed into servitude. Certainly you may, with a single corps, seize each State capital and chase away its Government; but what will that avail? No more than it did to the subjugation of Virginia, when the detestable Arnold and his army of deserters drove the Government under Mr. Jefferson from Richmond to Charlottesville. What will putting their Government to flight signify to a State fired with hatred of us, through its whole revengeful population? What care they for their feeble authorities, their plague in peace and no help in war? No: annihilate those authorities, if you will; you are, in them, fighting but a shadow: the substance—the people and its animosity—still remains, too widely scattered to be reached, too rancorous to be reconciled.

And now, upon the President's present plan of conquest, what must all this compel? It is only by attempting a conquest in detail, by trying to subdue and hold each separate Mexican State, that any thing can be hoped. And what does this plan inevitably imply? Nothing short of pouring upon Mexico some twelve or fifteen armed divisions, each from three to five, six or eight thousand strong, and, by maintaining an intimate and irresistible possession of all her territory, to weary out resistance, until not merely submission (which would otherwise cease the moment you withdrew your force) shall come, but a permanent willingness to wear your chains. Need we say that this is but a scheme for fastening our dominion upon Mexico, by fastening upon ourselves a great and perpetual Standing Army?

HAVE WE IT NOT ALREADY, the people all unconscious, amidst the din of successful arms and the talk of a subjected empire—sounds that have ever bewitched the unthinking, not less under popular Governments than under despotisms? For in both alike the fatal glory of extended dominion has ever captivated the giddy multitude, quite as sure to be pleased with the fancied addition to its own sway and greatness, as with the less direct honor of its master's. Our politicians greatly mistake, when they suppose that it is a peculiar "Anglo-Saxon" or American passion which renders the worst part of our people ravenous of the possessions of our neighbors. No: the real impulse is a far more universal one—the appetite of dominion, the vanity of military renown; which has ever made popular the Chief or the King who led on his citizens or his subjects to victorious enterprises against the peace and the freedom of other nations, no matter at how sure a sacrifice of their own.

The people, then, blinded by this unreflecting passion to the plain fact, we ask again, *Have we not already that acknowledged bane of public freedom, a large Standing Army*, the mere phantom of which has so often heretofore, when evoked by conjuring demagogues, filled the popular bosom with supernatural terrors? WE HAVE IT, as it is easy to show; and the President and his Ministers are demanding a large and permanent addition to it: yet neither fact seems, as yet, to have excited the slightest public alarm!

What is the present Army of the United States? What as to permanency of service? What as to numbers?

It consists of Regular troops, enlisted for five years, or for the war; and of Volunteers, nearly all of whom have enrolled themselves for the war—a period now obviously indefinite, if we are to fight on until Mexico shall make peace or be so subdued that we can hold what we like of her territory without an army. If our five years' regulars are to be considered a Standing Army, surely volunteers for a war which may not end during the present generation are still more a Standing Army. And let it not be forgotten that if peace—fictitious, or even real—came to be made upon those terms of territorial acquisition (the Californias and New Mexico) which the President insists on as indispensable to our honor and our rights, we must still keep an army as large as now on foot, to check all outbreaks of a hostile people, and not only take them to our yoke, but intimidate, by a superior force spread every where, Mexico from helping them when they prepare a secret insurrection or have burst into open revolt. Besides all this, we shall have, as soon as we get a false peace from Mexico, to re-establish our various military stations at home, from which nearly all the troops have been withdrawn, to send to Mexico; and Oregon, which has been heretofore neglected, will require a stationary force of at least some regiments of infantry and dragoons.

So much for the permanency of the military establishment which we have and must keep on foot; and now for its numerical extent.

The report of the Adjutant General, (we have not yet been able to find room for it, but shall do so,) which forms one of the documents appended to the present Message, exhibits the following statement of what our Army, as "authorized by law," now is:

Authorized regular force, officers and men.....	30,350
Volunteers for the war.....	34,171
Twelve months' volunteers.....	2,119
Total.....	66,640

Aggregate force..... 66,640
Such is the legal force which would now be in arms, if regiments were always full to their estimated complement of 1,100 men, or if none ever died. But the actual force now in campaign, or on their way to the seat of war, or left to take care of posts within the United States, is, according to the same report, as follows:

Regulars in the field or on their way.....	21,509
Volunteers do. do. do.....	22,927

Aggregate of those on active service.....	43,536
Add (we suppose) six companies of regulars and ten of volunteers, stationed at Indian posts within the United States.....	1,391

General aggregate..... 44,927

This, now, as a force permanently in arms, must be considered a standing army sufficiently formidable, if there was ever any reality in that dread of one which wise republicans have always taught, and nations more fond of their own freedom than ambitious of governing others have always cherished. But even this is not enough; the President calls loudly for ten more regiments of regulars, and (we suppose) as many more of volunteers; which, at full complements, will make twenty-two thousand men more. Thus we are to have, besides some twenty thousand "authorized by law," but minus of the full complement in some cases, a standing army, and not merely on paper, some sixty-seven thousand strong. Nor must we forget what the Adjutant General's report before us further says: that the troops heretofore kept in our seaboard and lake fortresses have all been withdrawn, in order to reinforce our armies in Mexico; and that they must speedily be replaced, not only because the defences of great maritime points, like those of Boston and New York, the Delaware, Old Point Comfort, Charleston, and others, or of Navy Yards like Portsmouth, Norfolk, and Pensacola, cannot be left unmanned, but because our great and costly system of sea-forts will fall into immediate dilapidation if left for but a year or two unoccupied by sufficient bodies of troops. So that the very supposition—the continuance of the war—which makes necessary the forces now asked, will equally require the raising of as many more troops—say some five or six thousand—as have been withdrawn from our fortresses; adding to which some thousands needed in Oregon, we must certainly count at not short of seventy-five thousand men the army which these Presidential plans of Mexican subjugation will require to be raised and permanently kept on foot.

Let it be remembered that, for these estimates, we take only positive data—facts now in existence, and furnished by the actual state of the army, or by the President's own requisitions and the consequences which they inevitably involve.

Behold, then, People of the United States!—you who trembled for your liberties, when the Federalists, in John Adams's day, raised a few thousand regular troops—you whom certain among us have, until within a few years, plied with alarms against even our poor little West Point army, which, except as a school of war, was but a name—behold what those very demagogues, with Jefferson ever on one point of their forked tongues and Federalism on the other, have brought you to! By the grossest Presidential usurpation, they have not only, in order to recover their failing party-popularity, plunged you into a war which that living patriarch of old republicanism, integrity, and wisdom, ALBERT GALLATIN, denounces to you, as if with his last breath, as utterly wrongful, cruel, and impolitic; but they are attempting, under the pretence that the national honor is at stake for the endless and relentless prosecution of such a war, to fasten upon you a perpetual standing army.

We need surely not recur to historical examples, nor cite the venerable authorities against such a fatal step. As in some other things, so, happily, there is, as to this, an instinct—we might almost call it a religion—in the public mind. It may have borne that a President of the United States should have contrived, for his own ends, a War which can hardly fail to be as pernicious in its event as it was bad in its origin; but, when the Public sees that, in addition to every other disaster, it is to fix upon us that bane of public freedom, a Perpetual Standing Army, will it not, besides distrusting and rejecting the new demands of patronage and power by the President, hold him to the strictest account for the use or abuse of the power already entrusted to his hands?

LATE FROM MEXICO.

In the absence of accounts from the army, the following brief extract is not without interest, being the latest yet received. It is from a letter, with a perusal of which we have been favored, from a most authentic and intelligent source, dated

CITY OF MEXICO, NOVEMBER 28.

Politically we are without any thing of interest to communicate. Although the Mexican Congress and Executive assembled at Queretaro have hitherto come to no determination upon the question of peace with the United States, the pacific party is nevertheless exerting itself, and we have no doubt that, if they are once allowed to treat, peace will be made.

[New York Com. Advertiser.]

LATE FROM SANTA FE.

We have intelligence from Santa Fe to the 20th October, received at St. Louis on the 13th instant. Several recruiting officers had arrived at St. Louis, and were to commence the service in a few days, for the purpose of obtaining eight hundred recruits, necessary to fill up the complement of the Illinois and St. Louis battalions. In the former deaths were of daily occurrence, but the latter more healthy.

Fifteen hundred American troops and twelve pieces of artillery were to be dispatched against Chihuahua, and three companies were already on the road, but had halted below Albuquerque, waiting reinforcements, as it was rumored that the Mexicans had been concentrated at El Paso. The American troops were expected to meet with a stubborn resistance either there or at Chihuahua.

The command that had arrived at St. Louis had suffered greatly from cold and hunger on their tedious route from Santa Fe.

From NEWFOUNDLAND.—The Conception Bay Herald of the 1st instant is filled with discussions touching the anticipated famine in that region, the danger of which is vehemently denied by one set of writers, and as vehemently asserted by another. Much is said, too, of pecuniary difficulties—the unproductive results of the fisheries, &c.; but we remark that all this is said in the guise of heated political controversy, and probably large allowance must be made for exaggeration.—N. Y. Com. Ad.